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     1 The Honorable Frank J. Magill, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                
No.  03-3940
                
ZHI XIU ZHENG
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
               
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(   No. A78 221 617 )
               
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Date: November 30, 2004 
Before:   RENDELL, ALDISERT and MAGILL1, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 9, 2004)
                
OPINION OF THE COURT
                
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
2Petitioner Zhi Xiu Zheng, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a final
order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on August 28,
2003. The order affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision to deny Ms. Zheng’s
request for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
We will deny the petition. 
I. 
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural
history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the
discussion.
II.
For a petitioner to establish that she is a refugee eligible for asylum, she must
demonstrate that she is unable or unwilling to return to her country of origin “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2000). A petitioner for asylum bears the burden of supporting her claim through credible
testimony. Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). An adverse credibility
finding by the IJ should be supported by specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief in
petitioner’s testimony. Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161-162 (3d Cir. 1998). In
asserting a claim under CAT, the applicant must establish “that it is more likely than not
3that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c)(2) (2002).
Where the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the
IJ’s opinion. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). We review the
IJ’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard, meaning that we will
uphold findings “to the extent that they are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Balasubramanrim, 143 F.3d at
161 (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)). 
Here, there is substantial evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
The IJ concluded that Ms. Zheng was not testifying truthfully about the core of her claim,
the forced abortion and the second IUD insertion, because she changed her testimony
when confronted with its impossibility. The IJ also denied Ms. Zheng’s application for
relief under CAT because she did not prove that she would be tortured by the Chinese
government. 
On appeal, Ms. Zheng argues that the BIA erred in: (1) affirming the IJ’s decision
without an opinion and not considering her fresh arguments; and (2) affirming the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding. 
We reject Ms. Zheng’s first contention because the BIA filed a brief opinion.
Moreover, we have approved decisions of our sister Courts of Appeals upholding the
BIA’s right to “simply state that it affirms [the immigration judge’s] decision for reasons
4set forth in that decision” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1996)).  We also reject Ms. Zheng’s
contention that the BIA failed to consider her “fresh arguments” because she raised no
new issues before the BIA. 
We now turn to Ms. Zheng’s second contention. She argues that: (1) although
“there may have been some factual omissions and oversights” in her testimony, it was “no
less direct, plausible, consistent and credible in regard to her forced abortion and IUD
insertion” (Pet. br. at 13.); (2) the contradictions did not go to the “heart of her claim.”
(Id. at 14.); and (3) any inconsistencies did not change the truth that she was forced to
undergo an abortion and that an IUD was inserted. 
We are not persuaded by Ms. Zheng’s arguments. Her inconsistent testimony
regarding the identity of the doctors who allegedly performed the coercive birth control
procedures was central to the entire basis of her claim. When testifying, Ms. Zheng stated
“clearly and unequivocally” that two different doctors performed the abortion and the
second IUD insertion. After being confronted with the fact that the same doctor signed
the certificate for the abortion and the second IUD insertion, Ms. Zheng changed her
testimony and claimed she had difficulty remembering because of the “extremely
traumatic” nature of the abortion.  Ms. Zheng’s testimony went through several more
revisions. The IJ plausibly concluded that “if the respondent were not thinking very
clearly, and she had any uncertainty about the identity of the doctors, it would have
5seemed that the respondent would have told that to the Court initially.” (App. at 20.)  
This discrepancy called into question the accuracy of the medical certificates and
raised legitimate concerns about their authenticity. Assuming the documents were
accurate, the truthfulness of Ms. Zheng’s testimony was highly questionable. Under either
scenario, the veracity of her claim that she was forced to undergo an abortion and two
IUD insertions was seriously called into question.
Ms. Zheng also gave conflicting testimony about the circumstances of her alleged
abortion. On direct examination, she testified that the doctor gave her an injection, which
caused her pain twelve hours later, after which the baby was aborted. On cross
examination, however, Ms. Zheng testified that a nurse gave her the injection and her
baby was aborted two hours later. 
Furthermore, the State Department's Asylum Profile called into question the
validity of Ms. Zheng’s medical certificates from China. The only document resembling
such a certificate that the State Department was aware of was one “issued by hospitals
upon a patient's request after a voluntary abortion.”(App. at 310.)
III. 
We have considered all arguments raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary. We hold that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s
adverse credibility findings and the BIA’s order. Accordingly, we will deny the petition
for review.  
